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AbStrACt Social media have become an important means of imposing ideas and interests in social 
conflicts. The Syrian conflict is analysed using sentiment analysis of tweets in order to establish how the 
sentiment shapes the modern political landscape and influences recipient knowledge. The importance of 
social networks and their potential in overthrowing regimes as well as in radicalization are highlighted. 
The authors suggest several stages that can be used for analysing tweets and how they impact the reader 
with selected narration. Sentiment analysis is used on a trained data set as a way to gain insight into 
tweets of different factions in the Syria conflict. Selected tweets on missile strikes were published on 14 
April 2018 and the day after. The Twitter profiles of three different sides – pro-Assad, pro-West and anti-
Assad – were also analysed. The results show that there is a real battle on social media with the purpose 
of influencing human emotions.
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introDuCtion
The demonstrations that began in 2011 on the wings of the Arab Spring broke out 
in a brutal clash with more than half a million casualties. The geopolitical situation 
in Syria was more complex, especially with active involvement and participation of 
five nuclear powers: France, the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Russia. 
Neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq also played an 
important role in the fighting at the time and tried to achieve their security goals in Syria. 
Internal factors were also extremely complex, through divisions between ISIS, Kurd, Al-
Qaeda and numerous other factions that controlled the Syrian population and directed 
it towards armed conflicts between the factions and/or the central government. The 
central government in Damascus had a favourable position because of the direct support 
of Russia and Iran, which enabled it to reach a military resolution of the violent conflict 
and reintegration of population. The Syrian conflict is highly publicized and the conflict 
of narratives shows great interest in shaping public opinion through the operations of 
influence. Johnson et al. (2017: 556) claim that platforms like Twitter “react quickly to 
events as they unfold and control the resulting discussion according to their views”. While 
some authors highlight that social media are often used for spreading specific narratives 
to target audience (Garrett, 2019; Hellweg, 2011; Simons, 2016), Garcia (2013: 249) claims 
that “Twitter has become a reflection of the public agenda”. 
No matter what theory we find more convincing, it is undeniable that many factions 
fighting for geopolitical targets in the Syrian space also struggle within the media space 
and every incident has a potential to gain attention of the international community. 
Terrorist organizations are changing their names (Jones et al., 2018), clashing factions 
fake attacks (RT, 2018) and are using means that allow them to change images or put 
more pressure on the opposition. Numerous social networks, TV channels, bloggers and 
influential individuals create a paradigm of communication, from the above-mentioned 
content distribution channels to Twitter and beyond. High-volume and short messages 
called tweets can display up to 280 characters (Perez, 2018) and are suitable for short 
messaging and are able to set up multimedia content such as videos and images. The 
speed of Twitter news coverage allows saturation of media space by planned attack.
the ArAb Spring
A series of protests that began at the end of 2010 in Tunisia soon became a wave of 
revolutions that grew into a complex relationship of political regime change, military 
intervention, radicalization of society and civil war while resulting in a large number of 
civilian casualties. The Arab Spring soon spread from Tunisia through the influence of 
social networks, and gave rise to the cases of successful regime change in: Libya, Egypt 
and Yemen. The vacuum of power enabled many actors to take advantage of the situation 
and turn the revolution against minorities and other factions. The protests in Tunisia were 
of a socioeconomic character as youth unemployment was a burdening issue that reached 
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degree, due to the impossibility of employment, committed suicide by self-immolation 
in the city of Sid. After the incident of self-immolation, the protesters clashed with the 
police and a couple of protesters died (Raghavan, 2011). Thanks to Facebook, many call 
the revolution in Tunisia ‘Facebook Revolution’ because of the great influence this social 
network had on the political situation in the country, as well as on bringing the situation to 
a global context (Lotan et al., 2011; Wulf et al., 2013). Satellite channels like Al Jazeera began 
to take video clips that had been released and broadcast them to the wider audience. All 
their stories, fears, dissatisfaction and excitement became a real power after they began 
to appear on television (Delany, 2011). A similar situation took place in Egypt where, after 
thirty years of rule, Hosni Mubarak was overthrown, after only eighteen days of protest. 
In the first democratic presidential election, the Muslim Brotherhood took the lead with 
Mohammed Morsi, who assumed the role of President of Egypt. Such a situation did not 
last long, and after a year, with the help of a military coup, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi removed 
President of Egypt Morsi from power. Moreover, he forbade the Muslim Brotherhood from 
participating in political activities (Hove and Ndawana, 2017). The Arab Spring in Libya 
had particularly significant geopolitical implications for international actors involved in 
overthrowing of Muammar Gaddafi where the UN Security Council failed to establish a civil 
government after overthrowing the dictator. Libya is still extremely unstable with around 
300 different military organizations colliding on a daily basis (el-Bijou, 2013). The protests 
in Yemen began in late January 2011 after citizens in the streets decided to support the 
revolution that took place in Tunisia and Egypt. The government responded to the protests 
using force, and on 18 March 2011, snipers killed more than fifty people in the capital city 
of Sanna. They tried to intimidate the public, but the opposite effect was achieved. The 
changes occurred, but the citizens were sceptical as the changes were a kind of rotation of 
people close to the previous regime. This movement led to a great social cleavage within 
the society, but also to the fragmentation of the Yemeni state. The localized struggles, 
involving both internal and external factors, with the aim to access resources and power, 
opened the door to a civil war that still lasts (Clausen, 2018; Fanack, 2017). 
the SyriAn ConfliCt of nArrAtiveS
In 2014, Khaldoun Khashanah in his work The Syrian Crisis: a systematic framework stated 
that there was no framework for understanding the Syrian crisis. This is a valid statement 
even today as well as the one that indicates that the complexity of the Syria crisis comes 
from two simultaneous confluences – an ideological as well as geopolitical. The Syrian 
conflict, in addition to its military and political aspects, also has a major clash in the media 
space whose goal is influence on the ground. A media study published by the European 
Institute on Peace in 2015, titled Syria in Global Media 1 and subtitled Representation of Syria 
in international digital media and social media from March 2015 – September 2015 speaks 
in favour of the geopolitical game that is visible in the media too. The study attempts 
to answer a few questions: What is the media discourse of the international media and 
social media on Syria like during the time chosen for the study?; Who writes about Syria, 
and what, according to a country or a media outlet?; What are the main themes on Syria 
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the international social media? Do the international social media reflect the Syria-related 
content of the mainstream media outlets?  The methodology behind the study includes 
analysis of digital and social media and eight top sources have been examined: Turkish 
Daily Sabah, Russian Sputnik International, Chinese Xinhua News, US The Washington 
Post, British BBC, Indian The Times of India, French France24 and VICE News whose 
headquarters are in New York, the United States. Two key findings on social media say that 
in “many cases there were small groups with clear political agendas posting content on 
Twitter or Facebook” and that social media “posts on Syria are challenging to track reliably 
due to a large amount of bots and ideological posting by different groups” (EIP, 2015). 
Extremist groups are also operating in that space, many of which have been declared 
terrorist organizations such as ISIS, al-Nusra, al-Qaeda and several al-Qaeda-affiliated 
factions (Jones, 2018). Radicalization of ISIS and other terrorist groups on social networks 
is fuelling the issue in Europe and the world as a whole, as terrorists can now create 
combatants and potential terrorists without the need for crossing borders. Popular social 
platforms Twitter, Facebook and YouTube thus become a battlefield of ideologies. The 
narrative uses the focus on political and ideological goals, as well as emphasizing that 
men in the West cannot practice their faith in Islam by creating ‘us against the whole 
world’ mentality in the targeted population. The sense of manhood and adventure in 
jihad is explained through excitement and comparison with playing video games (Brown, 
2018). Brutal videos with captives also play a role in radicalizing members of the group, as 
well as intimidating the enemy. The other great danger, apart from the social networks 
for radicalization, are terrorist returnees who, in organized cells, can influence their 
world viewers by transferring ideas and experiences from the battlefield to the civilian 
population. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a so-called caliph who declared the death of the 1916 
Skyes-Picot agreement that divided the region between the United Kingdom and France 
and has a major role in radicalization and the struggle of Islam in the Middle East. To the 
terrorism he replied by the statement that it was Allah’s judgment, worship of Allah as 
he had ordered and the rejection of humiliation and subordination. Pro-West messages 
on social media clearly express attitudes towards democracy, the overthrow of Assad, 
and the establishment of parliamentary democracy, guided by the principles of Western 
democracies. West support is primarily directed to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which acted 
as a coherent pro-West group at the beginning of the conflict. The military equipment, 
as well as the supply of modern military systems that have capacities comparable to the 
regime forces, is openly funded by the United States. Funding was directed to fighting the 
regime and to fight against Islamic extremists who came to Syria (Sanchez, 2018).
But as Ahad (2016: 25) said, apart from being a “theatre for great power political 
and military showdown”, the Syrian war has also been an “object of international media 
competition” which can be partly seen from the way in which media in Syria are financed. 
Brownlee (2017) argues that even before the outbreak of the uprising of 2011, the Syrian 
media had a strong international development. She concludes that in the field of media 
development, a new modus operandi (bottom-up support) of the West, and the USA in 
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Sophie Eisentraut (2018), from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs’ Global 
Security Research Programme describes in her blog this tangled Middle Eastern story that 
is taking place on Twitter too:
The stories and headlines promoted in pro-Kremlin Tweets are clearly aimed at increasing pressure on 
the Americans and their allies to abandon their engagement in Syria. Syria, these stories claim, is mostly 
restored to normality, suggesting that the only impediment to lasting peace is the continuing US military 
presence. One story recently pushed to the pro-Kremlin network’s US audience claims that the Syrian 
peace process is essentially being stymied by the Americans, who harbour radical militants in their 
garrison at al-Tanf, from which jihadists then launch attacks. 
twitter’S new bAttlegrounD
It has been known that the role of the mass media in influencing people’s perceptions 
and opinions is unquestionably important. With the technological and communication 
innovations, especially with the emergence of social media, this issue is even more 
noticeable. Social media are a “double-edged sword” as they can be used to both aid in 
manipulation as well as bring to light such manipulation (Simons, 2016: 5). Undeniably, 
the social media development and using social media as a means of information war 
are shaping the environment of conflicts, but also ”magnify the importance of the 
psychological battle to the conflict outcome” (Karatzogianni, 2005: 189). This is especially 
important in the case of Syria conflict as it is shown in Kozman and Melki’s (2018) study. 
They discuss the theory of the uses and gratifications in war and conflict using the Syrian 
conflict as a case study and the results show that among digital media, social media had 
the most important role.
One of such social media is Twitter. In 2018, this social network exceeded 335 million 
active users, which makes Twitter a significant and influential platform for radicalization 
and influence on political attitudes in general (Statista, 2018). Twitter’s microblogging 
format allows up to 280 characters, where users enter their messages, which can be 
liked, commented and shared, thus allowing news to spread quickly. Spreading news is 
facilitated by “#” (so-called hashtags) to mark certain news. From our point of view, we 
can interpret them as metadata related to the post. Followers can see posts from tracked 
profiles that appear in the news without the need to check # characters and track them. 
Numerous political announcements by US President Donald Trump, enhanced the 
popularity of this social network. Trump’s use of Twitter for political purposes provoked 
reactions from other powers, particularly in relation to Syria, where Russia explicitly stated 
that it would not engage in diplomacy via Twitter (Al Jazeera and News Agencies, 2018), 
but the media struggle was more than obvious. Even seven days before the Syria strikes of 
April 2018, US President Trump wrote on his Twitter profile 
Russia vows to shoot down any and all missiles fired at Syria. Get ready Russia, because they will be 
coming, nice and new and “smart!” You shouldn’t be partners with a Gas Killing Animal who kills his 
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This post was certainly very important for all later Twitter battles; especially those 
after the missile strikes against Syria had been started. After the US President Trump 
tweeted about the missile airstrikes launched by the USA, the UK and France on 14 April 
2018, Russian president Vladimir Putin said that this was an “act of aggression” and that 
strike would  ”have a destructive effect on the entire system of international relations” 
(Roth and Ellis-Petersen, 2018). Beside the media answer, Russia also gave active military 
help to Assad’s regime and the geopolitical battlefield spread beyond the virtual world of 
Twitter and other media as well. 
Twitter news reach the public much earlier than it is communicated via official 
channels of the presidential office, which makes space for wrong messaging. On the 
other hand, radicalization through promotion of terrorism itself, especially within the 
population of ISIS foreign fighters (Klausen, 2015) and violent threats become a major 
problem for the platform. In the first six months of 2016, Twitter suspended 235,000 
accounts for promotion of terrorism, adding that they had previously suspended 125,000 
accounts for the same reason. Daily suspensions from 2015 are up 80%, with increases 
during major terrorist attacks. The time of action for suspension was drastically reduced 
and cooperation with other social platforms was made to identify terrorist content (Woolf, 
2018). In addition to extreme profiles that publicly call for violence and are being removed, 
a large number of accounts do not invoke violence or terrorism, but are spreading lies and 
half-truths in order to change the public’s opinion on certain topics concerning the client. 
It is beyond any doubt that “Syria has become the most sophisticated battlefield in the 
world since 2011” (Zhou, 2019: 247) and these events surely influenced the opinions and 
emotions of many people around the world. 
reSeArCh DeSign AnD methoD
The attack on Syria by the United States, the United Kingdom and France that occurred 
on 14 April 2018 showed a drastic increase of 2000% Russian troll’s activity only a few 
hours after the attack. Their task was to spread disinformation about the attack on Syria by 
creating a new pro-Russian narrative. This narrative in coordination with social networks 
was later confirmed by Moscow’s statements that Syria had shot down 71 out of 103 
missiles (Read, 2018). The attack came as a reaction to a chemical attack on Douma, which 
was at the time under siege by government forces. Russia called the attack staged and 
claimed that it had been organized on social networks by White Helmets (Wintour, 2018). 
These events provoked numerous reactions and activities on social networks, and this 
paper attempts to answer the question as to how the conflict was manifested on the social 
network Twitter and to identify the goals and the consequences of this Twitter conflict.
In an effort to answer the above research questions, numerous tweets were collected 
and sentiment analysis was conducted. To understand the collected tweets, an important 
part is sentiment analysis that, through contextual mining of the text, identifies subjective 
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the monitoring of data. Sentiment analysis is intended to analyse ”people’s opinions, 
sentiments, evaluations, appraisals, attitudes, and emotions towards entities such as 
products, services, organizations, individuals, issues, events, topics, and their attributes” 
(Liu, 2012: 7). Pang and Lee (2008) quote several different terms used as synonyms for 
sentiment analysis such as ‘opinion mining’, that is frequently used, and some others which 
are not so common such as ‘subjectivity analysis’, ‘review mining’, ‘appraisal extraction’, 
‘affective computing’. Through the analysis of messages we can get basic information 
about sentiment that can be positive, negative and neutral as well as its subjectivity with 
respect to the trained data set (Gupta, 2018). 
There are lots of software solutions to conduct sentiment analysis and different 
methods for maximizing sampling efficiency (Taddy, 2013: 415). As Thelwall (2017: 545) 
stated, sentiment analysis research was originally driven by a commercial need but today 
it is used in many different fields such as marketing, economics, healthcare, education, 
politics and others. For example, Diakopolous and Shamma (2010) portrayed the 2008 
presidential debate between Barrack Obama and John McCain using aggregated Twitter 
sentiment. Stieglitz and Dang-Xuan (2013) were focused in their research on sentiment 
occurring in social media and how it is associated with a user’s behaviour in terms of 
information sharing or retweeting1 if we talk about Twitter. Taddy (2013) used this analysis 
for evaluating Twitter posts as positive, negative, or neutral in terms of sentiments 
directed toward particular U.S. politicians. It is not unusual that sentiment analysis is used 
for predicting the election results or discussing the potentiality of predicting elections via 
social media and sentiment analysis (Ceron et al., 2013; Kassraie et al., 2017; Metaxas et al. 
2011; Ramteke et al., 2016; Salunkhe and Deshmukh, 2017; Sharma and Moh, 2016; Tumasjan 
et al., 2010). Most of the authors listed above talk about sentiment analysis benefits, but 
Kennedy (2012) pointed to difficulties and critical perspectives on this analysis, especially 
the type which relies on a machine rather than on human analysis. When it comes to 
machine-mediated sentiment analysis, there are many different sentiment applications, 
software lexical solutions used for sentiment analysis. Some of them are SentiWordNet 
(Baccianella et al., 2010); SenticNet (Cambria et al., 2014), and SentiStrength (Thelwall, 
2017). Kabakus and Kara (2018) also cited AFFIN and NoSlang.com but they are dominantly 
directed to Twitter sentiment analyser approach based on linguistic techniques called 
TwitterSentiDetector. For the purpose of this research, Python as well as Phython’s library 
TextBlob are used. 
SAmple AnD proCeSS of DAtA ColleCting
If we look at the tweets published while the attack was happening, there were three 
distinct camps: pro-Assad, anti-Assad and pro-West. Key words selected for research are 
those that describe the attack and appear within the published tweets such as: ‘explosion’, 
‘strike’, ‘hit’, ‘attack’, ‘defence’, ‘Syria’ and ‘missile’. All of these tweets were collected during 
1 Unlike some other social media (Facebook, Instagram, etc.) sharing information on Twitter is done through so-called 
retweeting where users do repost or forward a message which is posted by another user. Retweet is done through easily 
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the 14 April 2018 attacks, as well as the day after the attacks, allowing commenting to 
all non-real time users that happened to comment events of 14 April during a coalition 
attack. Five chosen profiles are anonymised and, for the purposes of this paper, we call 
them Profile 1, Profile 2, Profile 3, Profile 4 and Profile 5. The initial profiles chosen to be 
quantified and measured by sentiment analysis for the West are Profile 2, Profile 3 and 
Profile 4, for pro-Assad Profile 1, while for anti-Assad Profile 5. The profiles are selected 
on the basis of their reporting bias that is displayed on the website ‘syria.liveuamap’ via 
random selection. Collecting tweets is conducted through three steps that follow a linear 
sequence of actions. In the first step, Twitter API2 is used as a landing point for connecting 
to Twitter and its interface. Once we connect to Twitter, we continue to the second step 
through the Python programming language where we use Tweepy to consume Twitter 
APIs by defining extraction rules, such as: key words, profiles, date, place, language 
and so on. In the second step, apart from the rules of extraction, a sentiment analysis is 
also performed in Python using a TextBlob, library for textual data or natural language 
processing tool that allows sentiment analysis with polarity and subjectivity analysis 
for collected tweets based on a trained data set. In the last third step, we are doing 
visualization of the sentiment analysis data by storing data as .csv which is then converted 
to .xlsx using the Excel program that allows visual representation through charts, tables, 
and the like. 
For polarity, a set of data from 1000 positive and 1000 negatively processed reviews 
was used. In the five-star system (or a compatible number system), we labelled three 
and a half stars or more as positive polarities, while two stars and less were considered 
negative polarities. With the four-star system (or compatible number system), we marked 
three stars or more as positive, while one and a half or fewer were considered negative. 
The letter system is quantified in a way that B or above is considered positive, while C 
or below is considered negative. The obtained points are between -1 and 1, where 1 is 
super happy and -1 is horrible. For example, ‘The weather is beautiful today in Zagreb with 
many wonderful people.’ would have a positive polarity of 0.7833, while ‘This is a violent 
and hateful sentence.’ would return a negative polarity of -0.8. In these examples, we can 
clearly see that certain words based on a trained data set classify sentences as positive or 
negative. Therefore, words like ‘beautiful’ and ‘wonderful’ affect positively polarization 
rating, while words such as ‘violent’ and ‘hateful’ lower the polarity rating. 
For subjectivity, 5000 subjective and 5000 objective sentences were used, assuming 
that all of the clips from the Rotten Tomatoes page are subjective, and all the sentences 
from the IMDb are objective. The assumption was made with the knowledge that the 
reviews on Rotten Tomatoes were written by users, while the IMDb reviews were written 
by professional reviewers. A potential problem of this approach consists in the fact that 
summaries may occasionally contain subjective sentences that are mistakenly labelled 
as objective, which may be the case with the use of sarcasm within reviews. The points 
of subjectivity are grades between 0 and 1, where 0 is the fact, while 1 is extremely 
2 As it is stated on Twitter Help Center, Twitter API  (application programming interfaces) is the way computer programs ‘talk’ 
to each other, so that they can request and deliver information. This is done by allowing a software application to call what is 
known as an endpoint: an address that corresponds with a specific type of information we provide (endpoints are generally 
























 .  (
22




D. Lucić, J. Katalinić, T. Dokman: SEnTIMEnT AnALySIS of ThE SyrIAn ConfLICT on TwITTEr
ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC PAPER / DOI: 10.20901/ms.11.22.3 / SUBMITTED: 5.7.2019.
subjective. For example ‘I can fly and shoot laser.’ returns 1 which is extremely subjective, 
while the sentence ‘In 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense purchased 149 Tomahawk 
Block IV missiles for $ 202.3 million’ returns 0 which marks it as a fact. Here we also see that 
certain words like ‘fly’ and ‘laser’ raise subjectivity, while words such as ‘Department’ and 
‘Tomahawk’ reduce subjectivity.
In short, while polarity measures the level of emotion in a text and the relation between 
rational and emotional statements, subjectivity expresses some personal beliefs, feelings 
or views. 
reSultS
The collected data are based on five Twitter profiles that served as the starting point 
for collecting tweets, as well as from the accounts that follow the profiles. The affiliations 
are divided into three groups:  pro-Assad, anti-Assad and pro-West, where for pro-Assad 
Profile 1 is selected, for anti-Assad Profile 5, while for the West: Profile 2, Profile 3 and 
Profile 4 are chosen. This random selection described in the text above is the reason 
why there are differences in their Tweet account as well as followers/following account. 
The results show that, compared to other profiles, Profile 3 has the fewest tweets and is 
the least followed among the profiles, but at the same time it has the greatest number 
of followers. By far the largest number of tweets belongs to the anti-Assad Twitter user 
Profile 5. Yet, it should be emphasized that most of its tweets/posts are retweeted or 
shared from other Twitter accounts. Pro-West Profile 2 is pretty active as well, but it also 
mainly shares others posts and news. 
 
Table 1. processed starting profiles
Extracted tweets vary considerably in their quantities and clearly indicate that they 
are not proportional to the total of all the tweets of a particular profile, nor to the number 
of followers. Certain Twitter profiles attract profiles that are much more active on social 
networks and convey news that are similar to the profile. After collecting tweets, we 
conducted a sentiment analysis in which tweets were processed through polarity and 
subjectivity.
Handle  following  followers  tweets   affiliation
Profile 1  2792  39300  6338  pro-Assad
Profile 2  1151  14500  30400  pro-West
Profile 3  770  43600  2700  pro-West
Profile 4  734  10400  4109  pro-West
Profile 5  3100  1257  122000  anti-Assad
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Table 2. processed following sentiment
In Table 2, the processed data are described and the results based on a trained data 
set used to classify sentiment. There were a total of 11,564 tweets containing pre-defined 
key words, as well as the release date associated with the missile attack. We can clearly 
see that pro-Assad tweets are the most numerous, which reaches the same number of 
people as the Pentagon warns, pointing out that the activities of Russian trolls during the 
attack increased by 2000%. For these activities, Kremlin is directly accused of financing 
and supporting the operations of influence through the ‘troll factory’ in Sankt Petersburg 
(Nimmo, 2018). For other users, the number of tweets is considerably smaller and there 
are significant differences in polarity and subjectivity between different affiliations. Most 
of the profiles are within neutral polarity, while pro-Western profiles are positive since 
the coalition launched an attack. The pattern for subjectivity where pro-Western profiles 
report with the greatest subjectivity is similar. Here we can notice that, although the pro-
Assad polarity is neutral, subjectivity is slightly higher, which shows that the activity of the 
trolls is with neutral polarity and light subjectivity that can influence the public opinion 
through the quantity of false information. It is interesting to see that the highest level of 
polarity as well as subjectivity can be assigned to Profile 3. His specific discourse could 
be characterized as literary as this user is also a writer who often uses words that affect 
human emotions. 
Tweets are based on previous profiles and there are 18,126 tweets matching the 
defined rules. There is a trend where pro-Assad Twitter profiles follow the profiles that 
write a lot more on the attack than pro-West or anti-Assad profiles. The difference is 
disproportionately large compared to the stable and proportionate tweets of other 
profiles. The behaviour pattern is identical and shows the increased activity of the trolls, 
which were activated during the attack as well as immediately after the attack.
Table 3 represents sentiment analysis of collected tweets for people who follow 
selected Twitter profiles. The largest number of tweets collected is again on the side of 
the pro-Assad trolls who overwhelmed the social network through their posting, and thus 
created a narrative. Polarity of pro-Assad tweets is positive and slightly subjective, while 
Profile 2 followers have by far more positive polarity and high subjectivity; the Profile 4 
reporter in one British media outlet has a high negative polarity and high subjectivity, 
since he is also a Syrian citizen and tells Syria’s side of the story. It is interesting that Profile 
5 as well as his followers have a very low level of subjectivity, but it is probably related 
Handle  following tweets polarity  Subjectivity affiliation
Profile 1  6559  0  0,075  pro-Assad
Profile 2  699  -0,1875  0,1875  pro-West
Profile 3  2308  0,25  0,5  pro-West
Profile 4  618  0,0167  0,2  pro-West
Profile 5  1378  -0,05  0,1  anti-Assad
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to the fact outlined above that Profile 5 is a user whose posts are dominantly shared or 
retweeted. In other words, he mainly broadcasts news and facts from other media.
Table 3. processed followers’ sentiment
Subsequently, six months later Pro-Assad Twitter profile called Profile 1 had been 
suspended due to Twitter suspension policy. The exact reason for the suspension of 
the profile whose followers had been the most active of all is unknown. Nevertheless, 
it is known that there are three common reasons for suspension in general: abusive 
behaviour, which means sending threats to others and similar; an account that has been 
hacked or compromised; and an account that is spamming others. Probably, Profile 1 
followers’ activity is the main reason why this suspension caused Twitter discussions on 
righteousness of the act. On 27 February 2019, one post on another pro-Assad Twitter 
profile appeared where the suspension of Profile 1 had been commented. The position 
was expressed that this was a wrong decision as well as a belief that many others would 
agree that Profile 1 account should be reinstated. Some commentators agreed with this 
but some expressed the pleasure for removing this profile from Twitter. On the other 
hand, all remaining analysed profiles are still active. Pro-West Twitter users Profile 2, 
Profile 3 and Profile 4 have increased the number of followers. Profile 2 has almost five 
thousand followers more than on 14 and 15 May 2018, Profile 3 has about two thousand 
and Profile 4 about three thousand followers more. Anti-Assad Profile 5 is also still active 
but the number of its Twitter followers had decreased by half. 
If we take a look at the current political and geopolitical situation in Syria and the 
Middle East in general, as well as possible scenarios for the future, the situation does not 
look optimistic. The situation in Syria today is still tense though it may not be at the same 
level as it was a few months ago, especially among the biggest actors, Washington and 
Moscow. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the same situation will not be repeated 
in the future or that it will not be even worse. Most but not all of US troops have left the 
war zone in Syria; ISIS and its caliphate idea have been defeated but a threat from many 
local jihadist groups is still alive; Russia is still giving strong support to President Assad’s 
regime; the situation in the north-western Syrian province of Idlib is escalating, especially 
between Syrian and Turkish forces; the Turkish alliance with Russia is no longer as stable 
as it was in September 2018 and in the months that followed the Sochi agreement. In 
addition to all the above mentioned, tensions between the USA and Iran have been 
Handle  followers tweets polarity  Subjectivity affiliation
Profile 1  11893  0,1  0,15  pro-Assad
Profile 2  1770  0,25  0,35  pro-West
Profile 3  995  0  0  pro-West
Profile 4  1881  -0,35  0,625  pro-West
Profile 5  1187  0  0,0833  anti-Assad
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escalating. The Twitter battlefield certainly will not rest. Moreover, it may be even more 
intense than it was before.
ConCluSion
Observing the paradigm of communicating on Twitter tells us that a certain side in 
conflicts has been actively promoting its interests through Twitter. We can even talk about 
information operations on social media, whose platform is adequate for influencing the 
recipients’ view of a specific topic as well as public knowledge. Information operation 
aims ”to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military 
objectives by undermining his will, cohesion, decision-making ability, through affecting 
his information” (MOD UK, 2002: 2-1). In this sense, social media environment presents a 
new and specific challenge which is also confirmed by the Syrian case. The April missile 
attack shows a real battle on social networks, a battle aimed at attacking human emotions. 
By quantifying the collected tweets, we noticed that on one tweet that falls under anti-
Assad or pro-West, there is an average of six pro-Assad tweets. Such a big difference 
points to institutionalized and sponsored posting through carefully designed campaigns 
targeted at spreading disinformation. By analysing Twitter accounts, we noted that pro-
Assad accounts attract the largest number of followers-They publish on average ten times 
more than other accounts. Their polarity is slightly positive, indicating the postings of 
happier content, their subjectivity is also slightly positive, which means that we find half-
truths in a large number. 
Such anti-social practice, as trolling for sure is, could thus transform a particular event 
into a narrative that suits them at a given moment, but also exacerbate or even cause 
very tense social relations. Impact on emotions by using targeted words that have higher 
polarity and subjectivity directs audiences to the desired behaviour or perceptions. The 
message comes to the user through a large number of posts with the help of a Twitter 
platform that facilitates short postings with a large number of reply options. Automatic 
publishing, as well as trained bots, allow for constant narration, while trolls are particularly 
suitable for real-time notifications, since responses need to be formatted on the basis 
of the input that is taking place. The trend of anti-social practice such as trolling for 
sure is, may be slowed down by legal frameworks, where parties will be punished for 
misrepresentation, but this will not prevent third parties from entering the media space 
and spreading their narrative. Critical thinking and narrative research requires a lot of time, 
and the best solution for the mentioned problem is free and independent journalism that 
citizens trust. Media consumers should also be aware that all media channels, especially 
social media, are playing a very important role and that they have become an extensive 
battlefield which is hard to control. Every second in the world, there are millions of 
deliberate, rogue, deceptive, malicious and aforethought attempts intended to influence 
people’s opinions and emotions. The Syrian case is very illustrative in this respect. The 
results of sentiment analysis presented above indicates that the struggle for human 
hearts and minds will continue to take place in this very broad and very auspicious field 
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AnAlizA SentimentA SiriJSKog 
SuKobA nA twitteru
Danijela lucić :: Josip Katalinić :: tomislav Dokman
SAžetAK Društveni mediji postali su bitna platforma za širenje ideja i interesa u društvenim sukobima. 
Za analizu sirijskog sukoba korištena je analiza sentimenta, kako bi se shvatilo na koji način sentiment 
oblikuje aktualno političko okruženje i utječe na znanje recipijenta. Rad ukazuje na važnost društvenih 
mreža, ali i na njihov potencijal u svrgavanju režima, kao i na sam proces radikalizacije. Autori predlažu 
nekoliko faza koje se mogu koristiti u analizi tweetova. Analiza sentimenta je korištena na treniranom 
skupu podataka kako bi se dobio uvid u tweetove različitih frakcija sirijskog sukoba. Odabrani tweetovi 
odnose se na raketni napadom 14. travnja 2018., kao i na dan nakon napada, 15. travnja 2018. Analizirani 
Twitter profili uključuju tri različite strane: pro-Assad, pro-Zapad i anti-Assad. Rezultati pokazuju da 
postoji stvarni sukob u društvenim medijima s ciljem utjecanja na ljudske emocije. 
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